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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 20-1499 
___________ 
 
J. FELIX MATEO GUILLEN-MARTINEZ, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED  
STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                     Respondent  
_______________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
BIA No. A215-928-617 
(U.S. Immigration Judge: Alice S. Hartye) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 November 12, 2020 
 
 Before:  HARDIMAN, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 










* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 J. Felix Guillen-Martinez, a Mexican citizen, petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’s order dismissing his appeal and affirming the Immigration 
Judge’s order denying cancellation of removal. In its decision, the Board agreed with the 
Immigration Judge that Guillen-Martinez did not merit cancellation of removal as a 
matter of discretion. Guillen-Martinez contends the Board and Immigration Judge failed 
to apply the correct legal standard to the established facts. We disagree and will deny 
Guillen-Martinez’s petition to the extent it raises a question of law. To the extent Guillen-
Martinez asks us to review the Board’s discretionary weighing of the equities, we will 
dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
I. 
After the Government began proceedings to remove Guillen-Martinez, he 
conceded removability but sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). At 
the conclusion of Guillen-Martinez’s immigration hearing, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 
denied his application for cancellation of removal. The IJ found that Guillen-Martinez did 
not establish the requisite exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying 
relative. In the alternative, the IJ found that Guillen-Martinez did not merit a grant of 
cancellation as a matter of discretion. In making her discretionary determination, the IJ 
balanced adverse factors evidencing Guillen-Martinez’s undesirability as a permanent 
resident against positive factors supporting cancellation of removal. As for the positive 
factors, the IJ highlighted that Guillen-Martinez has resided in the United States for over 
two decades, has children who are U.S. citizens, has worked consistently, and his 
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employer and his employer’s wife testified that he was a good worker whom they would 
rehire. The IJ also reviewed the adverse factor of Guillen-Martinez’s criminal history, 
which includes four DUI arrests leading to three convictions, as well as an arrest for a 
domestic incident that did not lead to a conviction. The IJ concluded that Guillen-
Martinez’s “criminal history, particular[ly] the number of DUI arrests and convictions, 
outweigh[s] the positive factors.” Guillen-Martinez appealed the IJ’s decision to the 
Board. 
The Board dismissed Guillen-Martinez’s appeal, agreeing with the IJ’s 
determination that Guillen-Martinez did not merit cancellation of removal as a matter of 
discretion based on his criminal history.1 The Board noted some of the factors favorable 
to Guillen-Martinez, including his length of residence in the United States, his significant 
family ties in the United States, and his employment history. But, ultimately, the Board 
found that Guillen-Martinez’s record of arrests and convictions outweighed the positive 
factors. Guillen-Martinez petitions for review. 
II. 
A. 
An applicant for cancellation of removal must satisfy statutory eligibility 
requirements, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), and establish he warrants relief as a matter of 
discretion. In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 10 (BIA 1998). In exercising her discretion, 
an IJ “must balance the adverse factors . . . with the social and humane considerations . . . 
 
1 In his brief, Guillen-Martinez raises challenges regarding the IJ’s exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship determination, but the Board declined to reach that finding, 
and it is thus not before us. 
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to determine whether the granting of . . . relief appears in the best interest of this 
country.” In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 11 (last alteration in original) (quoting Matter 
of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584–85 (BIA 1978)). The existence of a criminal record is 
an adverse factor, whereas evidence of genuine rehabilitation and evidence of hardship to 
family members if the petitioner is removed are positive factors. Matter of Marin, 16 I. & 
N. Dec. at 584–85. 
We lack jurisdiction to review discretionary denials of cancellation of removal, 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), and may not “reweigh the proper factors and make our own 
judgment call,” Hernandez-Morales v. Att’y Gen., 977 F.3d 247, 249 (3d. Cir 2020). But 
we retain jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).2 The phrase “‘questions of law’ includes the application of a legal 
standard to established facts.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1072 (2020). 
The Government contends we lack jurisdiction to review Guillen-Martinez’s 
claim. To the extent Guillen-Martinez merely disagrees with the Board’s discretionary 
balancing of the equities, the Government is correct. But the core of Guillen-Martinez’s 
argument is that the Board and IJ failed to apply the proper standard to the established 
facts.3 Specifically, Guillen-Martinez contends the Board and IJ failed to consider two 
positive factors: rehabilitation from his criminal offenses and the hardship to his family 
 
2 We review issues of law and constitutional claims de novo. Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 
F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017). 
3 Guillen-Martinez also contends the IJ’s consideration of crimes he committed more than 
ten years prior to his application for cancellation of removal infringed upon his due 
process rights. But Guillen-Martinez points to no law forbidding an IJ from considering 
such crimes in making a discretionary determination.  
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members if he were removed. We have jurisdiction to review whether the Board failed to 
apply the proper factors. See Gomez-Perez v. Holder, 569 F.3d 370, 372–73 (8th Cir. 
2009) (holding the court had jurisdiction where petitioner argued the Board “applied an 
incorrect legal standard by focusing on the present circumstances of his children rather 
than on the future hardships that they would face if he were removed” because that 
argument raised a question of law); cf. Hernandez-Morales, 977 F.3d at 249 (noting that 
we have jurisdiction over claims alleging the Board considered an improper legal factor). 
We find, however, that the Board and IJ did consider the proper factors, including 
rehabilitation and the hardship to Guillen-Martinez’s family members if he were 
removed. 
The Board noted that Guillen-Martinez had an employment history, significant 
family ties, and equitable and humanitarian factors weighing in his favor. The IJ noted 
that Guillen-Martinez loves and supports four children, all of whom live in the United 
States, and recognized that Guillen-Martinez had not been arrested for DUI since 2007. 
Accordingly, neither the Board nor the IJ ignored considerations of Guillen-Martinez’s 
family or rehabilitation in making their determinations.4 
Guillen-Martinez presented a sympathetic claim, but we find the Board and IJ 
applied the correct legal standard to the established facts. We will deny his petition to the 
extent it raises a question of law. To the extent Guillen-Martinez’s petition asks us to 
 
4 While it would have been preferable for the Board and IJ to explicitly reference 
rehabilitation and hardship to family members, we find no reason to doubt that the Board 
and IJ considered those factors. 
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review the Board’s discretionary decision, we will grant the Government’s motion to 
dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
III. 
 For the reasons provided, we will affirm the dismissal. 
